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B
ackground to the debate: In the United States, the 
passage of the Bayh–Dole Act in 1980 encouraged 
universities to license inventions for commercial 
development. Although this ﬁ  nancial incentive can stimulate 
academic researchers to discover new drugs and devices, 
there is concern that the possibility of monetary reward 
could distort investigators’ objectivity.
Ross McKinney’s Viewpoint: Universities Should 
Be Allowed, Provided the Trial Is Approved by an 
External Review Board
One of the principal missions of an academic health 
center is to advance the understanding and treatment of 
disease through clinical research. In this pursuit, there is 
a need for checks and balances. When Jesse Gelsinger, a 
relatively healthy young adult, died in Philadelphia during a 
clinical trial of a novel adenovirus-based genetic therapy for 
ornithine transcarbamylase deﬁ  ciency, it was a tragedy [1]. In 
retrospect, there were many clues that there were problems 
with the adenovirus vector, clues that neither the investigator 
nor the institution pursued. 
January 2005  |  Volume 2  |  Issue 1  |  e23  |  e9
The PLoS Medicine Debate
Should an Institution That Has Commercial 
Rights in a New Drug or Device Be Allowed 
to Evaluate the Technology?
Ross McKinney, David Korn
The PLoS Medicine Debate discusses important but controversial issues in clinical 
practice, public health policy, or health in general.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020009.g001
An external IRB could provide independent oversight of the trial 
(Illustration: Giovanni Maki) 
Open access, freely available onlinePLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0006 January 2005  |  Volume 2  |  Issue 1  |  e9
Attorney Alan Milstein made the case that the investigator 
and institution were both blinded to these problems by 
their heavy ﬁ  nancial investment in the technology, an 
investment worth millions of dollars [2]. Though the legal 
case was settled out of court, it created a de facto standard 
that institutions with commercial rights in a new drug or 
technology should not be allowed to pursue clinical trials 
involving that new technology. I do not believe that such a 
blanket prohibition is necessary. 
At its core, the issue revolves around conﬂ  icts of interest. 
In clinical research, the investigator should be primarily an 
advocate for the patient or volunteer. The core reason to 
perform clinical research is to create generalizable knowledge 
about a therapy, patient population, or a disease process 
with the long-term intent of improving human health. 
The interests of the patient and investigator should be 
fully aligned. However, most physicians in clinical research 
have other, more personal motivations, intermixed with 
the desire for progress. Successful research projects can 
lead to publications, promotions, grant renewals, and per 
case clinical trial enrollment fees. Some investigators have 
intellectual property rights that may have very substantial 
ﬁ  nancial value if the drug or device reaches the level of 
approval by the United States Food and Drug Administration. 
These investigators stand to gain personally if the clinical 
trial is successful, a situation that has the potential to distort 
the investigator’s objectivity, and may lead to a less honest 
relationship with study volunteers. 
In order to ensure that investigators are honest with 
potential research volunteers, the system of institutional 
review boards (IRBs) evolved. The IRB approves the 
informed consent document, which should describe the 
clinical experiment in a clear and dispassionate way to 
patients and their families. IRBs are largely made up of 
faculty and staff from the institution, although there are also 
public members and nonscientists on most IRB panels. The 
IRB must remain autonomous and be able to hold up or stop 
an investigation. There is an obligation that the IRB ﬁ  rst and 
foremost think about patient rights and safety. 
The passage of the Bayh–Dole Act in 1980 enabled 
universities to license inventions for commercial development 
[3]. The closer to Food and Drug Administration approval 
the drug or technology is at the time of licensure, the more 
valuable it becomes. Therefore, universities have an incentive 
to advance the clinical development of inventions by their 
faculty. In this regard, they are very much like corporate 
sponsors of research, subject to the same Food and Drug 
Administration oversight as corporations. 
In terms of performing clinical trials using new technologies 
in which it has a ﬁ  nancial interest, how is a university different 
from a corporate sponsor? In regard to patient safety, 
one primary distinction rests with the IRB. The corporate 
sponsor will present the research protocol to an independent 
commercial IRB, the university to its own IRB. Yet in both 
cases, there are potential conﬂ  icts of interest. The university 
IRB members will have a conﬂ  ict of interest between the 
investments of their employer and the rights of the research 
volunteers. Independent commercial IRBs depend on pleasing 
corporate customers for their continued existence, and there 
is an unstated expectation that they will both be fast and 
produce rulings consistent with corporate expectations (which 
in most cases include a desire to do the research ethically). 
At the university level a logical and conservative solution to 
the problem of institutional conﬂ  icts is to require that an IRB 
from outside the institution become the IRB of record when 
such a conﬂ  ict arises. This external IRB could be either an 
independent commercial IRB or one of another university. 
The key is to grant the IRB independence and the authority 
to provide real oversight.
There are other elements of conﬂ  icts of interest that need 
to be considered when the institution has a commercial 
interest, but most have more to do with the management of 
personal conﬂ  icts than institutional conﬂ  icts. The institution 
needs to assure the presence of an independent data safety 
monitoring board, thorough audits of good clinical practice, 
and a publications committee that will ensure submission 
of all meaningful study results, whether positive, negative, 
or neutral. Anyone subjectively evaluating patient data 
should be as free of conﬂ  icts as possible. These steps can be 
formulaically required, which should allow for performance 
of clinical research despite the presence of institutional 
commercial interests. 
David Korn’s Viewpoint: Academic Biomedical 
Research Must Be Free from the Taint of Financial 
Compromise
United States research universities, and especially their 
academic medical centers, have greatly beneﬁ  ted from their 
uniquely privileged status in our society. That status is rooted 
in public conﬁ  dence and trust that these institutions and 
their faculties will be independent and impartial in fulﬁ  lling 
both their academic mission to create, transmit, and preserve 
knowledge, and their duty to the general society to serve as 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020009.g002
A university’s ﬁ  nancial conﬂ  icts could inﬂ  uence the conduct 
of the trial 
(Illustration: Giovanni Maki)PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0007
credible, trustworthy arbiters of knowledge. One important 
mark of this status has been the remarkably consistent 
generosity of public support for biomedical research. Another 
has been the noteworthy deference of the federal government 
to university autonomy, and the light hand with which the 
sponsoring agencies historically have overseen the conduct of 
university research. 
When federal interposition occurred, it typically responded 
to widely publicized episodes of research misconduct, 
sometimes intertwined with egregious ﬁ  nancial self interests 
of investigators; these episodes legitimately questioned 
the effectiveness of institutional oversight. Nevertheless, 
regulations consistently focused more on deﬁ  ning the metes 
and bounds of the permissible than on prescriptive mandates, 
and their implementation was effected largely through the 
mechanism of “assurances”—commitments that institutions 
would faithfully safeguard the speciﬁ  ed perimeters of 
acceptable conduct.
Awardee institutions thus bear primary responsibility for 
assuring the credibility and integrity of federally sponsored 
research. Public conﬁ  dence in the trustworthiness of these 
institutions is critical, and yet nowhere is it more fragile 
than in biomedical research involving human participants. 
That conﬁ  dence eroded in the 1980s and 1990s because 
of reports of scientiﬁ  c misconduct and of individual 
and institutional ﬁ  nancial self interests in clinical trials. 
Scathing reports from federal oversight agencies and angry 
congressional hearings questioned whether ﬁ  nancially 
self-interested institutions could any longer be trusted to 
guard the welfare of research participants or the integrity of 
clinical research.
In 2001, the Association of American Medical 
Colleges convened a task force to examine and make 
recommendations on individual and institutional ﬁ  nancial 
self interests in clinical research. The task force began 
by recognizing four important trends over the past 
three decades. First, the nature and culture of academic 
biomedical research have changed, bringing the potential 
of commercial relevance even to the most fundamental of 
scientiﬁ  c discoveries. Second, there has been enormous 
growth in the extent and depth of interactions between 
research universities and industry, especially in biomedicine. 
Third, the public has become increasingly impatient that its 
extraordinary investments in research yield more effective 
disease preventions and therapies. Fourth, the involvement 
of academic researchers in the translation of their discoveries 
has been essential in bringing those discoveries to market and 
to the beneﬁ  t of public health.
But the task force, in its two reports, asserted that both 
individual and institutional ﬁ  nancial conﬂ  icts of interest in 
clinical research could be problematic [4,5]. It recommended 
urgent and substantial reﬁ  nement and strengthening of 
institutional policies and practices for monitoring, managing, 
and—when necessary—extinguishing such conﬂ  icts. 
Both reports rest on a common set of core principles. 
The most important is that institutions should regard all 
signiﬁ  cant ﬁ  nancial interests in research involving human 
participants as potentially problematic. Where such interests 
exist, there should be a rebuttable presumption that the 
concerned individual or institution should not conduct the 
research, absent compelling circumstances. Importantly, 
the task force, after intense debate, rejected categorical 
prohibitions lest they unintentionally impede the translation 
of research discoveries into tangible public beneﬁ  ts. 
The task force acknowledged that the issue of institutional 
ﬁ  nancial self interests is extraordinarily complex and 
sensitive, since it touches the very core of institutional 
autonomy. But the fact that an institution has a ﬁ  nancial 
interest per se should raise a strong presumption against 
its participation in the clinical testing of that product. 
Public accountability and scientiﬁ  c integrity require that 
all research results emanating from academic medicine be 
as free as possible from the taint of ﬁ  nancial compromise. 
Adding human participants to the research mix should 
raise the barrier to the highest level and require compelling 
justiﬁ  cation for any participation by a ﬁ  nancially self-
interested institution. 
The task force did not deﬁ  ne “compelling,” believing that 
each institution should make that determination based on 
disinterested scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of each 
case. For example, there may exist in a given institution a 
unique capability, without which the proposed research 
involving human participants could not be conducted as 
effectively or safely, or at all. In these instances, the public 
and science deserve access to that capability, provided 
the necessary safeguards are put in place to mediate the 
conﬂ  icting interests. In all such instances, protection of 
scientiﬁ  c integrity and the welfare of research participants 
must remain the foremost priority of both investigator and 
institution. 
This narrow window avoids absolute prohibition while 
striving to prevent institutional participation where credible 
alternatives exist. Only by such stringent self-policing can 
we sustain the trustworthiness and credibility of biomedical 
research, researchers, and their institutions, while continuing 
vigorously to promote the translation of biomedical discovery 
for the public’s beneﬁ  t.
Ross McKinney’s Response to David Korn’s 
Viewpoint
The public has every right to expect that academic 
institutions are working ﬁ  rst for the public’s interest. This 
value is even codiﬁ  ed in the laws granting these institutions 
tax-exempt status. The public also expects that new, more 
effective therapies will be developed swiftly as a consequence 
of its support for academic research.
The inventor of a new technology is always more motivated 
to see it through to widespread use than anyone else. This 
motivation, which may be as simple and benign as curiosity 
or as easy to understand as a ﬁ  nancial incentive, is a powerful 
force driving human research. This force can be disciplined 
and controlled by the IRB and policies on conﬂ  icts of 
interest. Personal investment in research is, nevertheless, an 
important driver of scientiﬁ  c progress. 
When society makes an unnecessarily broad assumption 
that nearly all research with ﬁ  nancial implications for 
investigators or their institution is potentially corrupted, 
a brake is placed on progress. Society will be better served 
by establishing clear guidelines and formalizing oversight 
of the research process than by rigidly limiting clinical 
research affected by conﬂ  ict of interest. As examples, clinical 
trials should have independent data safety monitoring 
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boards charged to review the study design, execution, data 
analysis, and publication of results. The IRB system should 
be strengthened in its independence through the use of 
community members. And, to be certain that institutional 
conﬂ  ict of interest is avoided, an IRB from outside the 
institution in most cases will be preferable
Society wants better treatments. The fact that an inventor 
has mixed motives for developing a new treatment has 
always been acknowledged. The need to carefully manage 
the experimental process in human studies has always 
been understood. However, when rules minimize the role 
of inventors at academic centers, by forcing trials of their 
new ideas to go to outside institutions, society loses more 
than it gains. The incremental gain in safety is likely to be 
small (particularly if oversight is well established), while the 
decrease in speed of development will be signiﬁ  cant. 
David Korn’s Response to Ross McKinney’s 
Viewpoint
There are many similarities between the position espoused 
by Ross McKinney and my position. Most saliently, we both 
recognize the critically important role played by academic 
biomedical scientists in making discoveries and in facilitating 
their efﬁ  cient translation into beneﬁ  cial products. Neither of 
us proposes that academic investigators, or their institutions, 
should be ﬂ  atly prohibited from trying to foster that 
translation in the presence of ﬁ  nancial self interests. 
But there is an important difference. McKinney’s approach 
for dealing with institutional conﬂ  icts of interest depends 
critically on the engagement of external agents to monitor 
closely both scientiﬁ  c integrity and the welfare of human 
participants. That, in my view, would require such deep 
interposition of those agents into the conduct of academic 
research as to be not only unprecedented but unfeasible. 
Beyond that, the approach falls short with respect to the 
maintenance of institutional trustworthiness and protection 
of public trust.
Routine clinical assessment of technologies by ﬁ  nancially 
interested institutions fosters public cynicism and distrust 
of the motives of academic biomedical researchers. The 
protective mechanisms recommended by McKinney are 
opaque to the public and reﬂ  ect a “business as usual” 
image that fails fully to account for the markedly changed 
circumstances and perceptions of academic biomedical 
research. Most important, the mechanisms appear to be 
aimed primarily at protecting institutions’ ﬁ  nancial interests. 
By contrast, the American Association of Medical Colleges 
formulation urges that any institutional involvement in 
clinical research involving human participants in the 
presence of ﬁ  nancial conﬂ  icts must be predicated on the 
presence or absence within the institution of demonstrably 
unique capability. This approach offers a much higher 
and more credible standard that aims to protect not only 
participant well-being and scientiﬁ  c integrity, but also 
institutional trustworthiness and public trust. 
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